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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of changes in the composition of real estate stock indices, 
considering companies both joining and leaving the indices. Stocks that are newly included not 
only see a short-term increase in their share price, but trading volumes increase in a permanent 
fashion following the event. This highlights the importance of indices in not only a 
benchmarking context but also in enhancing investor awareness and aiding liquidity. By 
contrast, as anticipated, the share prices of firms removed from indices fall around the time of 
the index change. The fact that the changes in share prices, either upwards for index inclusions 
or downwards for deletions, are generally not reversed, would indicate that the movements are 
not purely due to price pressure, but rather are more consistent with the information content 
hypothesis. There is no evidence, however, that index changes significantly affect volatility of 
price changes or their operating performances as measured by their earnings per share.  
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1: Introduction 
The index effect has become an increasingly widely known phenomenon over the last 25 years, 
primarily due to an increase in both the numbers and assets under management of passive 
index funds. This has made index composition of importance not only in the context of the 
investment strategies of passive funds but also because of the broader impact that the inclusion 
or exclusion of a stock from an index has upon its share price.The index effect can be defined 
as the impact that index re-composition changes have on the prices of the underlying stocks. 
The existence of “passive” funds that aim to track the performance of an index will ensure that 
demand for the stocks of firms entering the index will rise but it will fall for any stocks deleted 
from the index. Noting this repeated pattern of behaviour, arbitrageurs have found ways to earn 
profits by buying (selling) the stocks of added (deleted) firms before index funds make their 
trades and then selling them (buying them back) when index funds have completed their 
transactions.
1
  
 
Whilst a large literature has developed to consider the effect in the terms of mainstream 
indices, and especially the S&P 500, there has been very little to have considered more 
specialist benchmarks. Given that a reduced number of passive funds may track more specialist 
indices, it provides an interesting research question as to whether the index effect is reduced in 
such a context and thereby effectively limited to being of relevance in the context of the main 
benchmark indices only. It is this issue that this paper aims to consider using the example of 
European real estate securities. Over the course of the last decade, the European listed real 
estate sector has grown considerably, by June 2011 totalling 830 real estate stocks with an 
aggregate market capitalisation of €321.1bn, equating to 24% of the global listed property 
market. This growth has been driven by a number of key elements, none more so than the 
performance of the sector during the first half of the last decade. In comparison to mainstream 
equities, listed real estate, in both their REIT (Real Estate Investment Trust) and corporate 
form, delivered substantial outperformance. This, inevitably, led to increased investor 
awareness during a period of relatively poor stock market performance. The fact that this 
strong performance was not only observed in Europe but globally, added to the increased 
interest in the sector. In addition, particularly within a European context, the introduction of 
REIT regimes in the majority of the major European markets further increased investor 
awareness.
2
 These factors have had a wide range of impacts, including increased trading 
volumes and, key in the context of this study, an increase in dedicated funds. Enhanced 
awareness of and allocations held to real estate securities have therefore also led to an increase 
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in the visibility and importance of dedicated real estate security indices. Whilst obviously the 
primary purpose of such indices is their use in a benchmarking context, other factors also come 
into play. For example, in October 2007 NYSE-LIFFE-Euronext introduced two index futures 
contracts based upon the FTSE ERPA/NAREIT Europe and FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Eurozone 
indices (Lee et al., 2012).  
 
This paper therefore expands upon the limited literature to have considered the index effect in 
the context of sector specific indices. Even in the context of listed real estate there is a marked 
lack of existing empirical evidence, and in addition, these papers have solely considered the US 
REIT market. Ambrose et al. (2006) considered the impact of the change in policy in 2001 that 
facilitated the inclusion of REITs into mainstream S&P indices. However, the primary focus of 
the study was the longer term impact on REITs and specifically their relationship with the 
overall market. The study provided evidence that the beta of those REITs included in the S&P 
500 saw a significant upward movement, indicating increased co-movement with the overall 
market. Furthermore, the beta of indexed REITs with reference to a portfolio of non-indexed 
REITs showed virtually no change. Additional examination showed that the beta of non-index 
REITs also increased significantly with respect to the S&P 500. This would imply a sector-
wide impact and not one limited to those specific firms included in the S&P indices. The study 
of Feng et al. (2006) is of more direct relevance and broadly follows the methodological 
framework adopted in the mainstream finance literature. The paper considers the price impact 
of additions and deletions of REITs into the dedicated S&P REIT Index. The results reveal a 
small yet significant price response to index inclusions. This is of interest given that the index 
considered is sector specific. However, whilst a significant price response is observed, no such 
findings are reported with respect to trading volume or institutional investment.  
 
This paper considers a number of key research issues, focusing on the EPRA (European Public 
Real Estate) family of indices.
3
 Firstly, we examine the impact of index composition changes 
in the short-run. This analysis considers the impact of changes in the constituents on not only 
the stock prices of the affected firms but also their trading volume and volatility. A key 
element in this analysis is testing for any asymmetrical impacts with respect to any possible 
differential response for index inclusions and deletions. The paper also considers whether there 
is evidence of a size effect, the impact on operating performance and if the response differs 
across markets. Finally, we consider the long-run impact of index changes. The remainder of 
the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the theory and hypotheses that 
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underlie the body of empirical work to have examined the index effect. Section 3 describes the 
data and methodological framework adopted in the study. Section 4 presents and analyses the 
results, while Section 5 summarises and offers some concluding comments. 
 
2: Hypotheses behind the Index Effect 
This section briefly reviews the theoretical literature on the index effect and summarises the 
expected impacts that additions to or deletions from an index will have on the stocks 
concerned. The majority of studies to have considered the issue have focused on the S&P 500. 
This is not only because the level of assets tied to this index is much greater than for any other, 
but also because it has a more “vague” announcement policy that does not rely only on publicly 
available and observable measures; thus changes in the composition of the index cannot be 
easily predicted. Deletions from the index are usually caused by an event (e.g. merger, takeover 
or bankruptcy) that subsequently requires the selection of a replacement stock. When index 
changes are largely unpredictable, as they are for the S&P500, the method of announcement of 
such changes becomes important. S&P pre-announce the changes a variable number of days 
(on average around five) before the actual new composition of the index takes place. 
 
In the case where the re-composition criteria are clear, analysts can predict those changes in 
advance (see the FTSE or MSCI criteria, for example) and the event periods are not so 
significant, either statistically or economically, for the added or deleted stocks. The 
announcement and decision policy for the indices of interest for this study are laid out in the 
document, “Ground Rules for the Management of the FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Global Real Estate 
Index Series, Version 4.9 – September 2011.” The index committee examines data from the last 
business day of February, May, August and November, and then meets on the Thursday after 
the first Friday of March, June, September and December to agree any index changes, which 
then become effective on the third Fridays of those months.  
 
It is clear that the inclusion decision for the EPRA indices is based on size and other objective 
factors rather than being based on secret judgements behind closed doors as is the case for the 
S&P indices. As such, we would not expect a big jump in prices, either upwards for additions 
or downwards for deletions, as the announcements should in the main reflect market 
expectations. Therefore, there should be gradual movements in prices before the event unless 
index replicators ignore prior information and still wait until the event date in order to 
minimise their tracking errors. 
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Previous literature has suggested five different hypotheses to justify the index effect, 
depending on whether the price and volume effects are temporary or permanent. The studies 
below refer to the S&P index effect, which is significant until the present day, with price 
increase, upon index inclusion, that have ranged between 3% and 8%. The S&P 500 index 
effect has been more pronounced recently, due in part to the increase of assets held in index 
funds. The results also vary because of the differing length of event windows chosen, the 
specific methodology, the level of indexed assets at the time each study was conducted and the 
different assumptions for what constitutes the short or long run.  
 
The Price Pressure Hypothesis (PPH):After the event period, any abnormal return is expected 
to reverse fully and to reflect the long-term equilibrium price. The effect on trading volumes 
should closely resemble the price effect. Harris and Gurel (1986), Woolridge and Ghosh 
(1986), Lamoureux and Wansley (1987), Lynch & Mendenhall (1997), and Malkiel and 
Radisich (2001) support the concept of temporary price pressures after inclusion. 
 
The Imperfect Substitutes and the Downward-Sloping Demand Curve for Stocks 
Hypothesis(DSH):Stocks belonging to the index do not have perfect substitutes and have 
downward-sloping demand curves. Prices will therefore change to eliminate any excess 
demand in the market and hence no reversal is expected in the long-term. Abnormal trading 
activity should be temporary, until the new level of price equilibrium is reached. Shleifer 
(1986) and Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) support the DSH. Morck and Yang (2002) also 
found that S&P 500 membership was associated with significantly higher valuations of 
member firms.  
 
The Liquidity Cost Hypothesis (LCH):Inclusion should enhance the liquidity of the underlying 
stock and therefore lead to a permanent increase in the stock’s liquidity. Prices and trading 
volumes should both increase permanently. Mikkelson and Partch (1985), Edmister et al. 
(1996), Erwin and Miller (1998) argue in favour of the LCH. 
 
The Information Content Hypothesis and the Certification of an Index Member (ICH):After 
inclusion, an important piece of information is revealed that should have a permanent effect on 
prices and a temporary effect on volume. Dhillon and Johnson (1991), Jain (1987) and Kappou 
et al. (2008 and 2010) find evidence supportive of the ICH. 
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The Market- Segmentation and Investor Recognition Hypothesis (IRH):Investors know of only 
a subset of all stocks and just hold the stocks that they are aware of. Inclusion alerts investors 
to the existence of a specific stock, but they cannot become unaware of a deleted stock (at least 
not initially, although they may gradually forget about it), therefore the effects should not be 
symmetrical between additions and deletions. Chen et al. (2002, 2004) have supported the IRH. 
 
In addition to index tracking, an equally important factor is the announcement policy. Index 
committees have reconsidered their methods of announcement of index changes, due to 
concerns about the price and volume pressures that could occur around the event period. The 
more money tied to an index, the more important the announcement policy. Since 1989, the 
S&P index committee has allowed a window of five days on average between announcement 
and event, to alleviate price pressures caused by active traders who were trying to make money 
from index fund managers. Index Fund managers had to trade specific stocks on specific dates 
and times, for the purposes of a perfect index replication. Beneish and Whaley (1996) tested 
the effects of changing the S&P announcement policy.  
 
3: Data and Methodological Framework 
The core data used in this paper consists of the relevant information for all stocks that were 
added to or deleted from the EPRA indices from 31 December 1999, when many indices were 
launched, until 25 November 2011. This paper considers a variety of EPRA indices which are 
examined in this study, including both country specific and continent wide benchmarks. We 
include index re-compositions from Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. The indices 
that we examine are the EPRA Europe Index, the EPRA Europe Liquid 40 Index, the AIM 
Index (UK), and the EPRA Global Index. It should also be noted that EPRA allow both REITs 
and property companies to enter their indices. We focus only on index changes and exclude 
from the analysis any corporate events that do not involve entering or leaving an index, such as 
delisting, mergers, rights issues, etc.   
 
Data on stock prices, daily trading volumes, market values and earnings per share, were all 
obtained from Datastream. All of the analysis was conducted in local currency. Due to the 
international nature of the sample we adopt two alternative indices as benchmarks. The first is 
the FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Global Developed Market Index in order to capture global 
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movements in real estate firms. The second is the S&P 500. Whilst this initially may appear a 
strange choice, it provides a number of counter points to the aforementioned 
FTSE/EPRA/NAREIT index. Firstly, as a non-European index it provides a benchmark that 
none of the firms analysed are potential constituents of. Secondly, by being a non-real estate 
index it deepens the analysis and benchmarks the firms against the broader equity market.  
 
We employ total return indices rather than stock prices throughout, which capture dividends 
paid and allow for stock splits and rights issues. Following the removal of any companies 
where the requisite data were not available from Datastream, we were left with 366 additions 
and 37 deletions in the sample pooled across all countries and indices. The imbalance in the 
addition and deletion samples can be explained by reference to the methodology used in the 
construction of the indices. The indices, and therefore their composition, are at least partly 
based upon minimum market capitalisation figures. This is unlike indices such as the S&P 500 
or FTSE 100 which are based upon a set number of firms
4
. The majority of EPRA indices have 
no stated maximum number of constituents, leading to an in-built bias towards additions in 
comparison to deletions. The exception in this regard is the Liquid 40 Index. 
 
This sample makes up our main sample for the baseline regressions, although we also examine 
countries separately where the remaining number of companies is sufficiently large to be able 
to conduct a reliable analysis. It is important to note that some firms enter multiple indices and 
therefore they will be included in our database more than once. This is important since it 
allows us to fully capture the index effect for all companies and it is sometimes the case that 
they enter the various indices at different points in time. Therefore a given firm’s price, volume 
etc. may display different behaviour depending on the index that it enters and the timing of the 
event. 
 
Changes in the composition of indices have generally been examined through the use of 
standard event study methodology. Previous researchers have mainly used the simple model 
where an abnormal stock return is determined by the difference of the stock return and the 
index return on a given date, or have used the single index model, where the market risk factor 
(beta sensitivity) is also included. Such approaches subtract out (using varying techniques) the 
impact of general market-wide movements on the returns to hone in on the pure impact of 
company-specific events. Kappou, Brooks & Ward (2010) also used the Fama-French 3-factor 
model in order to account for size and book to market effects. However, we do not subtract 
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away the returns due to size and style using this approach for two reasons. Firstly, it is 
debateable whether this kind of performance attribution is relevant to listed real estate as the 
majority of real estate securities will display the broader characteristics of value stocks. In 
addition, only a small proportion of firms can be classified as large cap. Secondly, we prefer to 
capture the impact of size more directly by splitting the sample of companies by their market 
capitalisations.  
 
Previous studies have used a variety of different approaches for calculating abnormal returns 
during the event window. However, the most common method adopted is the single-factor 
model, incorporating market risk. Estimates of the alpha and beta coefficients can be obtained 
using a historic estimation period. However, Jain (1987) and Edmister, Graham and Pirie (1994 
and 1996) argue that the parameter estimates derived from the period before the event would 
be biased since the firms were likely to have performed well prior to their inclusion in the 
index. In other words, they might well have been included in the index precisely because of 
their relatively good recent past performance. We therefore employ a post-event period of 250 
trading days together with the single index model to calculate REIT betas and thus to control 
for market-wide movements. In the regression analysis below, the variables are defined as 
follows: Rit is the return on firm i at time t, Rmt is the return on the market index, which is the 
value-weighted return on all stocks in the EPRA or S&P500 benchmark, a is the return when 
the factor portfolio returns are zero, bm is the sensitivity to market risk, and utis a disturbance 
term. The single index model is specified as follows for each firm i at time t: 
 
Rit = a + bmRmt+ut      (1)  
 
The abnormal return for each stock will thus be given by: 
 
]ˆ[ mtmitit RbRAR        (2) 
 
The abnormal returns for all stocks are then averaged against the total number of additions or 
deletions N for each day t of the event window as: 
1
1 N
t it
i
AAR AR
N 
     (3) 
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where, t = t-5 to t+15 for the short-term event window, and t = t-5 to t+180 for the long-term 
event window. The average abnormal returns are summed over the event window in order to 
obtain a cumulative average abnormal return CAARI,T for each time period from day I to T. 
 
,
T
I T t
t I
CAAR AAR

    (4) 
 
To test the statistical significance of the AARs and CAARs, two-tail t-tests are performed that 
are defined as follows. For testing AARs: 
 
( )Sˆ
t
t
AAR
t stat
AAR
-    (5) 
 
where AARt is the average abnormal return at time t, t = t-5 to t+15 for the short-term event 
window and t = t-5 to t+180 for the long-term event window, ( )Sˆ tAAR is the standard deviation 
of the average abnormal returns over the estimation period (250 trading days), given by the 
following formula: 
 
2
250
1
1
( ) (  )
249
Sˆ t t t
t
AAR AAR AAR

     (6) 
 
For testing the CAAR: 
,
( )Sˆ
I T
t
CAAR
t stat
AAR n
-    (7) 
 
where, CAARI,T is the cumulative average abnormal stock return from day I to T and n is the 
number of days between I and T. The null hypothesis is that the AARs and CAARs should be 
zero
5
. 
 
We also examine volume patterns before, during and after addition. Volume data can give 
important information about the timing of purchases by index funds and other institutional 
investors, as well as demand that might have been caused by arbitrageurs. Index funds might 
choose to wait for the event date in order to minimize their tracking errors, even if this means 
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that they end up paying more for newly included stocks or have to sell the deleted ones for 
lower prices. In order to calculate the level of abnormal volume, volume ratios were computed, 
a method also employed by Harris and Gurel (1986) and by Beneish and Whaley (1996).
6
 The 
average relative stock-to-EPRA Index volume ratios were estimated over a period of 12 weeks 
(60 trading days) before the event window, considered and compared with the daily stock-to 
index ratios observed during and after the event period
7
.The null hypothesis is that the mean 
volume ratio across all firms for each day t of the event period is one. The formulae for 
calculating volume ratios are: 
 
5
 
65
 ( )
1
= 
60
i
t AD
it
mtt AD
BVR
V
V
 
 
  (8) 
 
it
it i
mt
V
VR BVR
V
   (9) 
1
1 N
t it
i
MVR VR
N 
   (10) 
 
where the base relative volume ratio BVRi is the average stock-to-index trading volume in the 
12 weeks before the start of the event window, Vit and Vmt are the trading volume of each stock 
and the corresponding benchmark volume on each day t of the event window respectively, 
MVRt is the mean volume ratio across firms on each day t of the event window and N is the 
number of firms in the sample. 
 
 
4: Results 
4.1: The Index Effect on Returns 
Table 1 presents the results for the sample of additions, pooled across countries and indices, 
over the event window from day t-5 to day t+15. The final five rows display the cumulative 
returns for the pre- and post-event windows, and also for a long-run window comprising 180 
post-event trading days. The returns are presented as daily percentages along with the 
corresponding t-ratios. We present the raw returns and also the abnormal returns calculated 
using the single index model approach described above. We employ the EPRA Developed 
Market and S&P500 indices as benchmarks in columns 4-5 and 6-7 respectively. The final 
column presents the number of firms in the sample, N, on each day during the event window. It 
is clear that the figure is near the maximum available of 366 for most days, although a handful 
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are lost before the event – due, for example, to firms making their debut on the market and then 
being listed in an EPRA index the same day or a day or two later. 
 
The most salient feature is one of positive and highly statistically significant positive returns 
until the day before index inclusion but then an almost zero return on the event day. We 
therefore conclude that market participants are aware that a company will enter the index and 
exert net buying pressure on the days before index entry. Focusing on the raw returns, these are 
positive on four of the five final pre-event trading days, and are largest (1.34%) and most 
significant (t-ratio = 7.66) on the day just before the stock enters the index, cumulating in an 
average pre-event week’s return of 2.4%. The event day return is not statistically significant 
but there is a larger (although still not significant) average return of 0.75% during the three 
trading weeks following index inclusion. Over the longer-run window, the average return is 
highly significant and positive at around 13%.  
 
It is clear that the use of abnormal or raw returns makes no qualitative difference to the results, 
but subtracting the market-required rates of return reduces both the short-run and long-run 
returns compared to their unadjusted values, perhaps indicating that index recompositions tend 
to occur around times of buoyancy in the overall market. 
 
Table 2 presents a parallel set of results to Table 1, except that we now focus on deletions. It is 
evident from the final column that the sample is now much smaller, and this somewhat reduces 
the statistical significance of the results, although not their salience. Again, the conclusions are 
unaltered whether we examine raw or risk-adjusted returns. Returns are persistently negative 
for the whole pre-deletion trading week, although they are not significant except for the day 
before the event. Prices fall on average by 1.5% each day from t-5 to t-2, and then by almost 
10% the day before the event. On the actual day that the firms are removed from their indices, 
there is a bounce-back, with prices rising on average by a statistically significant 8.6% and then 
by a further cumulative (statistically significant) 13% during the three trading weeks following 
deletion. Thus, examining the entire short-run event window from one week before to three 
weeks after the event, prices rise, rather than fall, by around 5-6%, depending on whether raw 
or abnormal returns are considered. Examining the long-run post-event cumulative returns in 
the final row of Table 2, these are large, positive (of the order of 40%), and statistically 
significant.   
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At first blush, these results seem odd, with deletions having larger (i.e. more positive) effects 
than additions for the event day and the period following it. One possible explanation is that 
the additional media attention that arises from the news of a deletion, despite it representing 
bad news, puts the company on the radar of investors such that net buying pressure rises rather 
than falls. There is some evidence that this is indeed the case for stocks (see Barber  and 
Odean, 2008).  
 
Another possible explanation is that these results are being driven by the behaviour of a small 
number of specific firms during the event period. The number of additions is sufficiently large 
that we would expect the presence of outliers in the sample to have negligible effects on the 
overall patterns of returns. However, for the deletions sample, at 38, this argument does not 
apply. An examination of the data shows that indeed there are a number of instances where the 
prices of certain stocks rise and then fall again substantially the next day, particularly for the 
deletions sample. For instance, the price of UK firm Minerva fell 21% around 5 months prior 
its deletion from the Liquid 40 Index on 1 April 2001 and then fell a further 32% the very next 
day. An even more extreme example is that of Quintain Estates and Development, again a UK 
based firm, that was deleted from the Liquid 40 Index on 21 June 2010. On 31 March 2009, it’s 
price fell by 45% in a single day, but then rose by 69%, 46%, 25%, 13% and 22%, an overall 
rise of 330% during the following five trading days.  
 
Given the potential effect that these sorts of extreme price moments could have, we remove 
from the samples of additions and deletions any returns that are greater than 20% in absolute 
value. This threshold is, of course, entirely arbitrary, but should at least avoid the most 
egregious examples of anomalous behaviour that is almost certainly not due to the index effect 
in any case. Given that it is impossible to separate out the index recomposition effect from any 
other corporate events that may be taking place for a particular company, this is the only 
approach we can adopt. Note that the number of sample firms remains the same as above, but 
we remove individual return observations (i.e. they are set to missing values) that fall outside 
of these ±20% bounds. We then repeat all of the analysis above and produce Tables 3 and 4, 
which are identical to Tables 1 and 2 respectively but are constructed based on the samples 
with outlying returns removed. We also plot the cumulative average abnormal return 
performance (EPRA benchmark adjusted) for the average addition and deletion from day t-5 to 
day t+15 (Figures 1 and 2 respectively). 
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As we expected, not only because of the larger sample size, but also because of the much lower 
proportion of returns considered outliers, the results for additions are qualitatively identical to 
the full sample results presented in Table 1 and the average returns change only by a few basis 
points per day. Therefore, we need not discuss Table 3 further. For the deletions in Table 4, 
however, the story is very different. Focusing on the raw returns, it is clear that the outliers had 
a considerable impact on the results and presented a misleading picture. Once they are 
removed, the pre-event returns are still highly significant and negative: -11.5% (t-ratio = -4.87) 
for the week before the deletion takes place. Although there is still a reversal on average both 
on day t (a return of 1.5% with a t-ratio of 1.5) and cumulatively over the three post-deletion 
weeks (a return of 5.5% with a t-ratio of 1.3), it is evident that these figures are much smaller 
than before and are no longer statistically significant. We can therefore conclude that the 
reversal (i.e. the subsequent price rise) is only partial and over the whole event window the 
return is around -5%. Similarly, the long-run post-event performance is now a negative -3.3%, 
although it is not significant, where it was +40% previously. Given that these outlier-removed 
results are comparable for additions but much more sensible for deletions, we proceed to 
employ these rather than the unadjusted data in all subsequent return-based analysis. 
 
Studies involving the S&P500 have argued that since the announcement regarding changes in 
the composition of the index are made when the market is closed, most of the announcement 
effect can never be realised by traders since the price trades at a higher (lower) level 
immediately at the open the day after the announcement for additions (deletions). It is thus 
argued in this literature that it is important to examine the open-to-close return on the event 
date rather than the typical daily returns which are usually measured on a close-to-close basis. 
However, for the sample of firms that we consider, it is clear from the returns that investors 
know about index recompositions and trade on this information at least a few days prior to 
them taking place. As such, there is only a minimal return on the event day and therefore no 
need to be concerned with this issue.  
 
4.2: Index Effects by Country 
In Tables 5 and 6, we examine the index effects for the abnormal returns using the EPRA 
benchmark and with outliers removed separately by country (or more accurately, by currency 
area). We separate the sample and analyse the UK, the euro-zone, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland and the UK for additions, and the euro-zone and the UK for deletions (since there 
are insufficient data points for reliability regarding the other countries).  
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Considering the additions in Table 5, the first point to note is that the results are qualitatively 
identical for all countries, although the magnitudes are quite different. The biggest effect is for 
Denmark, with a cumulative return of almost 6% the week before an addition including a 
return of nearly 4% on day t-1, and a further cumulative return of just under 4% the three 
weeks after the event. For all other countries in the additions sample, the short-run effects are 
relatively muted, although they are slightly stronger for the euro-zone and weakest in the UK 
and Switzerland. The long-run figures paint a different picture, however, with cumulative 
returns of 21% for Denmark and for Sweden, 10% for the UK, 6% for Switzerland, but less 
than 5% for Norway and the euro-zone. 
 
Focusing now on the deletions sample in Table 6, the effects are similar for the UK and euro-
zone and the results confirm those of Table 4 above. There are highly significant negative 
returns during the week before the event (-9.5% for the euro-zone and -16.7% for the UK, with 
little price movement on day t but further considerable (although not statistically significant) 
falls over the long run (-4.6% for the euro-zone and -10.7% for the UK).  
 
4.3: Index Effects for Small versus Large Firms 
It is possible that the event of an addition or deletion will have a bigger impact on smaller 
capitalisation stocks than on otherwise identical stocks that are larger. The argument would go 
that large cap stocks are already liquid, heavily traded, and widely tracked by analysts. Larger 
firms may already be included in institutional investors’ portfolios and any information content 
of index membership may not play a significant role. Smaller firms, on the other hand, derive 
more relative advantage when being in the index, and one should therefore expect those firms 
to keep more of the positive return realised during the event period. Moreover, smaller firms 
may be subject to less frequent announcements and therefore, information effects may be more 
important (Ohlson, 1979). Finally, small firms are also more likely to be affected by the 
positive liquidity shock of inclusion. As such, small stocks arguably have more to gain from 
additions, and more to lose from deletions, than large stocks, in part since the impact of being 
included in an index on the profile of a small firm will be considerably greater, possibly 
propelling them into the media spotlight and creating important new demand for their shares 
from index trackers.  
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To test this conjecture, we sort the pooled sample of additions (after the removal of outlying 
observations as discussed above) by market capitalisation into three portfolios (two portfolios 
for deletions) containing equal numbers of stocks – a portfolio of small stocks, a portfolio of 
medium-sized stocks, and a portfolio of the largest capitalisation stocks
8
. We then examine the 
cumulative abnormal returns relative to the benchmark over the key date ranges around index 
inclusion (in Table 7) and deletion (in Table 8). For the additions in Table 7, the results clearly 
support the suggestion, since there is a clear monotonic reduction in abnormal returns when 
moving from small through medium to large firms over all of the relevant date ranges, except 
on day t where medium-sized firms have the largest reversal of the previous days’ price 
increases. So the average cumulative abnormal returns over the pre-event week are around 
1.4% (significant at the 1% level) for small firms but only 1.2% for larger firms (significant at 
the 5% level). Over the long-run post-event window (t to t+180), the results are even more 
striking – the return is almost 16% for the smallest tricile of firms (significant at the 0.1% 
level), 5% for medium sized firms (significant at the 10% level) but only 4% for the largest 
firms (not even significant at the 20% level). For the deletions in Table 6, the pre-event fall in 
price is considerably greater in both magnitude (-18.6% versus -7.2%) and statistical 
significance (t-ratio of -6.1 versus -2.7) for the small firms than the large, and the post-event 
reversal over the following three trading weeks is more marked for the small firm sample 
(10.2% versus 3.6%), and is marginally significant. 
 
4.4: Index Effects and Volatility 
Cooper and Woglom (2001) argue that the increase in trading that occurs around the time of an 
index addition will cause its volatility, a measure of its total risk, to rise. A combination of 
increased demand by index funds, and speculation by arbitrageurs and noise traders (see also 
De Long et al., 1990) can cause a temporary increase in volatility. However, provided that 
inclusion in the index, or removal from it, does not affect a firm’s underlying operating 
performance and therefore its cashflows, there should be no long-run effect on volatility.  
 
We examine in Table 9 whether the volatility of abnormal returns changes after index 
recompositions for additions and deletions. We again employ the sample where outlying 
observations have been deleted from the database. In order to minimise the noise that occurs 
around the event period itself, we focus on long-run volatility and measure the standard 
deviation of returns from 250 days before the event to 250 days after. When we compare the 
actual levels of volatility before and after the event, we find that both fall modestly – by 1.2% 
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for additions and by 6.1% for deletions. If we compute the ratio of variances of the pre- over 
post-event periods, this constitutes a test statistic to examine the null hypothesis that the 
variances are equal. Considering the p-values for these tests in the final row of Table 9, it is 
evident that there is no significant change in volatility following index inclusion or removal. 
This lends support to the notion that index changes do not have discernible impacts on the 
underlying performance of the firm over the long run
9
.  
 
4.5: The Impact on Trading Activity 
Table 10 reports the volume ratios around the time of the event for the additions and deletions 
samples constructed using the methods described above. We also present the t-ratios that test 
the null hypothesis that the true volume ratio is unity on each day. Considering first the 
additions sample, we can see that the ratios are highest on days t-2 (4.6) and t+1 (2.1)
10
. The 
former is a remarkably high figure, with the value of shares traded per day being on average 
almost five times its usual value, although interestingly it is not statistically significantly 
different from one, indicating a considerable amount of variation across companies within the 
sample. For deletions, the volume ratios are highest on day t-1 (2.8), t (2.2), t+1 (3.3) and t+4 
(2.4). Taken together, these figures clearly indicate that there is enhanced trading activity both 
before and after the event
11
. In order to ascertain whether this continues in the longer run after 
the initial impact of index addition or deletion subsides, the second panel of Table 8 shows the 
average (over firms and across the days within the window) volume ratios. Indeed it is the case 
that volume ratios are highest around the event (just before day t for additions but on day t for 
deletions), and the volumes never fall back to their pre-event values, even several months 
afterward. This is consistent with the broad finance literature. It is a common occurrence that 
trading volumes increase due to market maturity and/or increased investor awareness. 
Specifically these are findings broadly supportive of the liquidity hypothesis
12
.  
 
In order to ascertain whether the largest price movements take place at the same times that 
trading activity peaks, Figures 3 and 4 present volume ratios (left-hand scale shown using bars) 
and returns (right-hand scale shown using a line) in the same graph for additions and deletions 
respectively. From Figure 3 for additions, it is hard to identify much similarity between the 
patterns of trading activity, which peaks on day t-2 but remains above its long-term average 
value throughout the event window, and returns, which are mostly positive throughout but peak 
on day t-1. Similarly for the deletions in Figure 4, large volumes and large price movements 
are not coincidental. Returns are persistently below zero before the event but slightly positive 
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on day t and thereafter, while volumes peak on day t+1 (also when the largest negative return 
of over 5% occurs), but are also particularly high on day t+1, t+4 and t+6 whereas returns on 
those days are all very close to zero. Finally, Figure 5 plots the volume ratios for additions and 
deletions side-by-side to make it easy to determine whether their peaks coincide or not. It is 
clear from the figure that they do only to a limited extent – both are around the event date, with 
volumes for additions peaking on day t-2 and those for deletions being higher than their usual 
figures on days t-1 to t+1.  
 
4.6: The Incorporation of Earnings per Share 
In order to determine whether the long-term operating performance of the firms is affected by 
index inclusion or removal, we now investigate whether the earnings per share (EPS) of the 
securities change after the event. Previous studies have also employed the price-earnings (P/E) 
ratio for this purpose – see, for example, Malkiel and Radisich (2001); however, such ratios are 
driven not only by operating performance as captured by the earnings, but also the share price 
itself and as such, any changes picked up by the analysis may simply be capturing the price 
effects that we have already discussed. EPS calculations also bring with them another issue 
however, which is that while P/E ratios are unit free, EPS have the units of the currency of 
denomination of their stock; this is not a problem for studies focused on a single country, but is 
in our instance since we have a pan-European sample. In order to conduct a valid analysis, we 
therefore separate the whole sample into separate country sub-samples where the number of 
firms is sufficiently large: the UK, the Euro-zone, Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Switzerland 
for additions, and the UK, the Eurozone and Sweden for deletions.  
 
It has been argued that index inclusion may afford added firms better relationships with 
financial institutions concerning their debts or other liabilities (Chen et al., 2002), thus 
specifically implying that index membership causes better operating performance through 
lowering the costs of debt. Alternatively, it has been argued that a strong and growing earnings 
profile is correlated with index inclusion and a weak and deteriorating profile with removal, 
and thus the index recomposition is the effect of the operating performance and not the cause. 
 
We compare the figures one year before the event and one year after, and the results are 
presented in Table 11 for additions and Table 12 for deletions. For four of the six countries 
analysed, earnings increase by around 20-40% the year after inclusion (Table 11), although for 
Norway and Switzerland (the two smallest countries that we analyse in terms of numbers of 
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additions), they fall by around 20%. A t-test for the equality of the mean EPS figure before and 
after the event shows no significant values for any of the six countries, however. Interestingly, 
earnings also rise after deletion events, as shown by Table 12 – by around 20% in the UK and 
Swedish cases but only by 1% in the Euro-zone. The results with respect to operational 
performance, as measured by EPS, do have to be placed into context when considering real 
estate firms. The nature of the cash flows that real estate companies derive generally displays 
far greater stability than in many other industries. Therefore, it is not surprising that our 
findings do not display the same magnitude of changes as observed in some of the mainstream 
finance literature. 
 
5: Concluding Comments 
This paper has added to the literature examining the impact of firms entering and leaving 
benchmark indices. Where this paper differs from extant studies is through the consideration of 
multiple indices, in this case the FTSE EPRA NAREIT family of indices. Our study constitutes 
one of only a handful to examine sector-specific indices rather than those that are market-wide. 
We examine the effect on prices, trading volumes, volatilities and operating performance in the 
short- and longer-terms. Our key finding is that the prices of newly included companies rise, 
and those of deleted firms fall, around the time of the index changes. We also conclude that 
index inclusion has a long-lasting, even permanent, effect upon trading volumes. However, 
there is also evidence of arbitrage activity and/or tracker fund purchases of additions and sales 
of deletions around the time of index re-compositions. There is no evidence, however, that 
index changes significantly affect volatility of price changes or firm operating performance as 
measured by their earnings per share.  
 
Returning to the hypotheses that we outlined at the beginning of the paper, we could argue that 
since the price increases for additions and the falls that occur for deletions appear to be largely 
permanent and are not subsequently reversed, this finding lends weight to the information 
content hypothesis. That the price changes around index re-compositions are not temporary 
effectively rules out the price pressure hypothesis. The results on volumes, where they rise 
substantially around the time of the event but never subsequently return to their pre-event 
values is also supportive of the liquidity hypothesis where index membership increases 
liquidity through enhanced trading activity that arises as a result of heightened investor 
awareness of specific firms that enter the media spotlight following the announcement of either 
an addition or a deletion.  
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Table 1: Returns for the Pooled Sample of Additions 
 
Day Raw Returns Abnormal Returns  
(EPRA Benchmark) 
Abnormal Returns  
(S&P Benchmark) 
N 
 Return (%) t-ratio Return (%) t-ratio Return (%) t-ratio  
        
t-5 0.50 2.86 0.35 2.25 0.39 2.34 358 
t-4 -0.43 -2.47 -0.03 -0.22 -0.05 -0.32 358 
t-3 0.49 2.79 0.20 1.29 0.33 1.99 359 
t-2 0.50 2.86 0.14 0.91 0.23 1.38 360 
t-1 1.34 7.66 0.68 4.35 0.79 4.70 364 
t 0.05 0.31 -0.01 -0.08 0.02 0.12 366 
t+1 0.20 1.15 -0.05 -0.34 0.04 0.21 366 
t+2 -0.29 -1.66 -0.09 -0.59 -0.20 -1.21 366 
t+3 -0.15 -0.84 0.12 0.76 0.09 0.54 366 
t+4 0.35 2.02 0.33 2.13 0.34 2.02 366 
t+5 -0.07 -0.41 0.02 0.13 -0.02 -0.14 366 
t+6 0.24 1.36 0.10 0.64 0.17 0.99 366 
t+7 -0.02 -0.10 -0.02 -0.15 -0.04 -0.26 366 
t+8 0.43 2.44 0.30 1.91 0.40 2.39 366 
t+9 0.29 1.66 0.19 1.22 0.10 0.61 366 
t+10 -0.08 -0.44 -0.04 -0.25 0.08 0.46 366 
t+11 0.04 0.21 -0.06 -0.36 -0.07 -0.43 365 
t+12 -0.04 -0.22 -0.06 -0.42 0.01 0.08 365 
t+13 0.01 0.04 0.12 0.79 0.03 0.17 365 
t+14 0.01 0.06 -0.12 -0.78 -0.13 -0.78 364 
t+15 -0.17 -0.96 -0.20 -1.26 -0.21 -1.24 364 
Cumulative Returns 
t-5 to t-1 2.40 6.13 1.33 3.83 1.70 4.51  
t only 0.05 0.31 -0.01 -0.08 0.02 0.12  
t+1 to t+15 0.75 1.11 0.54 0.89 0.57 0.88  
t to t+180 13.05 5.54 9.61 4.59 12.61 5.58  
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Table 2: Returns for the Pooled Sample of Deletions 
 
Day Raw Returns Abnormal Returns 
(EPRA Benchmark) 
Abnormal Returns 
(S&P Benchmark) 
N 
 Return (%) t-ratio Return (%) t-ratio Return (%) t-ratio  
        
t-5 -1.83 -1.40 -1.52 -1.22 -1.77 -1.38 38 
t-4 -1.13 -0.87 -2.04 -1.64 -2.12 -1.66 38 
t-3 -1.42 -1.09 -1.70 -1.36 -1.40 -1.09 38 
t-2 -1.73 -1.33 -1.39 -1.12 -1.72 -1.34 38 
t-1 -9.05 -6.95 -9.71 -7.79 -9.60 -7.49 38 
t 8.61 6.62 8.77 7.04 8.81 6.87 38 
t+1 1.59 1.22 1.19 0.95 1.27 0.99 38 
t+2 1.67 1.28 2.11 1.69 1.82 1.42 38 
t+3 -0.36 -0.28 -0.24 -0.19 -0.30 -0.23 38 
t+4 -0.34 -0.26 -0.34 -0.27 -0.07 -0.06 38 
t+5 -0.52 -0.40 -0.09 -0.07 -0.59 -0.46 38 
t+6 1.45 1.11 1.00 0.80 1.08 0.84 37 
t+7 -0.50 -0.39 -0.80 -0.64 -0.63 -0.49 37 
t+8 2.21 1.70 2.29 1.84 2.57 2.00 37 
t+9 2.22 1.71 2.40 1.92 2.08 1.62 37 
t+10 3.08 2.37 3.55 2.85 3.76 2.93 37 
t+11 1.01 0.77 0.54 0.43 0.77 0.60 37 
t+12 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.32 0.25 37 
t+13 1.23 0.95 0.79 0.64 0.97 0.75 37 
t+14 -0.91 -0.70 -1.05 -0.84 -0.73 -0.57 37 
t+15 1.15 0.89 1.48 1.19 1.31 1.02 37 
Cumulative Returns 
t-5 to t-1 -15.15 -5.21 -16.36 -5.87 -16.61 -5.80  
t only 8.61 6.62 8.77 7.04 8.81 6.87  
t+1 to t+15 13.02 2.58 12.88 2.67 13.62 2.74  
t to t+180 40.03 2.29 41.00 2.44 45.22 2.62  
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Table 3: Returns for the Pooled Sample of Additions with Outliers Removed 
 
 Raw Returns Abnormal Returns 
(EPRA Benchmark) 
Abnormal Returns 
(S&P Benchmark) 
N 
 Return (%) t-ratio Return (%) t-ratio Return (%) t-ratio  
Day        
t-5 0.50 3.01 0.36 2.36 0.40 2.47 358 
t-4 -0.43 -2.60 -0.03 -0.23 -0.06 -0.35 358 
t-3 0.49 2.93 0.20 1.32 0.33 2.07 359 
t-2 0.50 3.01 0.15 0.96 0.24 1.45 360 
t-1 1.22 7.25 0.62 4.14 0.73 4.52 364 
t 0.06 0.33 -0.09 -0.59 -0.06 -0.35 366 
t+1 0.20 1.21 -0.05 -0.33 0.04 0.24 366 
t+2 -0.29 -1.75 -0.10 -0.63 -0.20 -1.26 366 
t+3 -0.15 -0.88 0.12 0.79 0.09 0.56 366 
t+4 0.35 2.12 0.34 2.23 0.34 2.11 366 
t+5 -0.07 -0.43 0.02 0.14 -0.02 -0.15 366 
t+6 0.24 1.43 0.11 0.71 0.17 1.04 366 
t+7 -0.02 -0.10 -0.03 -0.17 -0.04 -0.28 366 
t+8 0.43 2.56 0.30 1.98 0.40 2.47 366 
t+9 0.29 1.74 0.19 1.24 0.10 0.63 366 
t+10 -0.08 -0.46 -0.04 -0.27 0.07 0.46 366 
t+11 0.04 0.22 -0.06 -0.37 -0.07 -0.44 365 
t+12 -0.04 -0.23 -0.07 -0.46 0.01 0.06 365 
t+13 0.01 0.04 0.12 0.79 0.03 0.17 365 
t+14 0.01 0.06 -0.12 -0.80 -0.13 -0.81 364 
t+15 -0.17 -1.01 -0.19 -1.28 -0.21 -1.28 364 
Cumulative Returns 
t-5 to t-1 2.28 6.09 1.29 3.83 1.64 4.55  
t only 0.06 0.33 -0.09 -0.59 -0.06 -0.35  
t+1 to t+15 0.76 1.17 0.54 0.92 0.57 0.91  
t to t+180 11.56 5.13 8.15 4.02 11.08 5.09  
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Table 4: Returns for the Pooled Sample of Deletions with Outliers Removed 
 
Day Raw Returns Abnormal Returns 
(EPRA Benchmark) 
Abnormal Returns 
(S&P Benchmark) 
N 
 Return (%) t-ratio Return (%) t-ratio Return (%) t-ratio  
        
t-5 -1.83 -1.72 -1.67 -1.67 0.14 0.14 38 
t-4 -2.02 -1.90 -2.59 -2.59 -0.22 -0.22 38 
t-3 -1.42 -1.34 -1.72 -1.72 2.01 2.01 38 
t-2 -1.06 -0.99 -1.00 -1.01 0.45 0.45 38 
t-1 -5.23 -4.93 -5.43 -5.44 -0.98 -0.98 38 
t 1.55 1.46 1.23 1.23 -1.66 -1.66 38 
t+1 1.05 0.99 0.52 0.52 -2.58 -2.58 38 
t+2 0.57 0.54 0.94 0.94 -1.71 -1.71 38 
t+3 -0.36 -0.34 -0.19 -0.19 -1.00 -1.00 38 
t+4 -0.34 -0.32 -0.30 -0.30 -5.43 -5.43 38 
t+5 -0.52 -0.49 -0.46 -0.46 1.23 1.24 38 
t+6 0.42 0.40 0.07 0.07 0.53 0.53 37 
t+7 -0.50 -0.47 -0.53 -0.53 0.94 0.95 37 
t+8 1.01 0.95 1.28 1.28 -0.17 -0.17 37 
t+9 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.15 -0.26 -0.26 37 
t+10 1.58 1.48 2.09 2.09 -0.44 -0.44 37 
t+11 0.32 0.30 -0.09 -0.09 0.08 0.08 37 
t+12 0.03 0.03 -0.11 -0.11 -0.51 -0.52 37 
t+13 0.69 0.65 0.33 0.33 1.29 1.29 37 
t+14 0.39 0.37 0.33 0.33 0.15 0.16 37 
t+15 1.15 1.09 1.30 1.30 2.10 2.10 37 
Cumulative Returns 
t-5 to t-1 -11.55 -4.87 -12.41 -5.56 -12.37 -5.54  
t only 1.55 1.46 1.23 1.23 1.23 1.24  
t+1 to t+15 5.49 1.34 5.34 1.38 5.48 1.42  
t to t+180 -3.35 -0.23 -4.10 -0.30 -2.83 -0.21  
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Table 5: Returns for the Sample of Additions by Country with Outliers Removed 
 
Day Euro-zone Denmark Norway Sweden Switzerland UK 
 Return 
(%) 
t-ratio Return 
(%) 
t-ratio Return 
(%) 
t-ratio Return 
(%) 
t-ratio Return 
(%) 
t-ratio Return 
(%) 
t-ratio 
             
t-5 
0.54 2.48 0.40 0.54 -0.79 -0.80 0.24 0.56 -0.37 -0.86 0.30 1.52 
t-4 
-0.38 -1.75 -0.11 -0.15 -0.71 -0.72 0.80 1.87 0.25 0.60 0.13 0.69 
t-3 
0.19 0.88 1.81 2.40 1.72 1.73 -0.74 -1.73 -0.22 -0.51 0.20 1.01 
t-2 
0.39 1.77 -0.09 -0.12 0.39 0.39 -0.04 -0.09 0.53 1.24 -0.03 -0.15 
t-1 
0.72 3.27 3.90 5.19 0.54 0.54 0.84 1.95 0.87 2.05 0.15 0.75 
t 
-0.04 -0.18 0.49 0.66 0.46 0.47 -0.30 -0.71 -0.34 -0.80 -0.12 -0.59 
t+1 
0.17 0.80 0.15 0.20 0.80 0.80 -1.15 -2.67 -0.82 -1.93 -0.19 -0.99 
t+2 
-0.08 -0.35 0.34 0.45 -0.59 -0.60 -0.63 -1.46 -0.94 -2.21 0.04 0.18 
t+3 
-0.09 -0.40 0.55 0.73 0.11 0.11 -0.20 -0.46 -0.02 -0.04 0.22 1.13 
t+4 
0.35 1.61 0.46 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.54 1.25 -0.27 -0.64 0.30 1.52 
t+5 
-0.04 -0.19 -0.70 -0.94 -0.68 -0.69 0.57 1.33 -0.07 -0.16 0.10 0.53 
t+6 
0.14 0.63 0.38 0.50 -0.63 -0.63 0.49 1.14 0.76 1.79 -0.03 -0.17 
t+7 
-0.06 -0.27 0.57 0.76 -0.37 -0.38 -0.17 -0.39 -0.37 -0.88 0.04 0.21 
t+8 
0.35 1.59 0.83 1.11 -0.44 -0.44 0.30 0.69 0.39 0.93 0.22 1.12 
t+9 
0.23 1.04 0.77 1.03 -0.11 -0.11 0.48 1.11 0.20 0.48 0.06 0.29 
t+10 
-0.26 -1.16 -0.41 -0.54 -0.23 -0.23 0.32 0.75 0.29 0.68 0.13 0.67 
t+11 
-0.15 -0.68 0.98 1.31 0.33 0.33 0.12 0.28 -0.19 -0.44 -0.08 -0.42 
t+12 
-0.31 -1.41 0.60 0.80 -0.18 -0.18 1.26 2.94 1.23 2.90 -0.16 -0.79 
t+13 
0.04 0.19 -0.20 -0.26 -0.18 -0.18 0.10 0.22 0.35 0.82 0.19 0.98 
t+14 
0.07 0.34 -0.41 -0.55 -0.13 -0.13 0.04 0.10 -0.35 -0.81 -0.29 -1.46 
t+15 
-0.17 -0.77 -0.08 -0.11 0.21 0.21 -0.12 -0.27 -0.01 -0.02 -0.40 -2.02 
Cumulative Returns 
t-5 to t-1 
1.46 2.97 5.91 3.52 1.14 0.51 1.10 1.14 1.07 1.13 0.75 1.71 
t only 
-0.04 -0.18 0.49 0.66 0.46 0.47 -0.30 -0.71 -0.34 -0.80 -0.12 -0.59 
t+1 to t+15 
0.21 0.25 3.82 1.31 -1.48 -0.38 1.95 1.17 0.20 0.12 0.15 0.20 
t to t+180 
4.10 1.39 21.08 2.09 4.97 0.37 21.11 3.65 6.32 1.11 10.25 3.88 
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Table 6: Returns for the Sample of Deletions by Country with Outliers Removed 
 
Day Euro-zone UK 
 Return (%) t-ratio Return (%) t-ratio 
     
t-5 
-1.01 -0.87 -2.52 -1.86 
t-4 
-2.79 -2.40 -2.92 -2.16 
t-3 
-1.95 -1.67 -1.43 -1.06 
t-2 
0.34 0.29 -2.73 -2.01 
t-1 
-4.09 -3.51 -7.09 -5.23 
t 
1.22 1.04 0.26 0.19 
t+1 
0.43 0.37 0.60 0.44 
t+2 
0.95 0.82 1.15 0.85 
t+3 
0.23 0.20 -0.61 -0.45 
t+4 
-1.26 -1.08 0.67 0.50 
t+5 
-1.68 -1.45 0.78 0.58 
t+6 
-0.91 -0.78 1.32 0.97 
t+7 
-0.13 -0.12 -0.72 -0.54 
t+8 
1.31 1.12 1.09 0.80 
t+9 
0.49 0.42 -0.38 -0.28 
t+10 
1.70 1.46 1.69 1.25 
t+11 
-1.20 -1.03 0.89 0.65 
t+12 
0.24 0.21 -0.85 -0.63 
t+13 
0.34 0.29 0.69 0.51 
t+14 
0.33 0.28 0.32 0.24 
t+15 
2.14 1.84 -0.02 -0.01 
Cumulative Returns 
t-5 to t-1 
-9.49 -3.64 -16.68 -5.51 
t only 
1.22 1.04 0.26 0.19 
t+1 to t+15 
2.99 0.66 6.60 1.26 
t to t+180 
-4.63 -0.30 -10.74 -0.59 
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Table 7: Cumulative Returns for the Pooled Sample of Additions, Split by Firm Size, with 
Outliers Removed 
Day Small Firms Medium Sized Firms Large Firms 
 Return (%) t-ratio Return (%) t-ratio Return (%) t-ratio 
t-5 to t-1 1.37 3.12 1.31 3.05 1.20 2.07 
t only -0.02 -0.08 -0.21 -1.09 -0.04 -0.16 
t+1 to t+15 2.36 3.11 0.40 0.54 -1.36 -1.36 
t to t+180 15.86 6.03 4.62 1.80 4.15 1.20 
 
Table 8: Cumulative Returns for the Pooled Sample of Deletions, Split by Firm Size, with 
Outliers Removed 
Day Small Firms Large Firms 
 Return (%) t-ratio Return (%) t-ratio 
t-5 to t-1 -18.61 -6.10 -7.17 -2.66 
t only 2.19 1.60 0.43 0.36 
t+1 to t+15 10.16 1.92 3.61 0.77 
t to t+180 2.41 0.13 -8.89 -0.55 
 
 
Table 9: Pre- and Post-Event Absolute and Relative Volatility 
 Additions (N = 358) Deletions (N = 35) 
 Pre Post Pre Post 
Average daily volatility 
Standard Deviation (%) 
1.73 1.71 4.12 3.87 
Percentage fall in volatility 
after event (%) 
1.16 6.07 
Ratio of Variances (Post / Pre) 1.01 1.14 
p-value (H0: constant 
variance) 
0.46 0.35 
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Table 10: Volume Ratios on days t-5 to t+15 for Additions and Deletions 
 
Day Additions Deletions 
 Ratio t-statistic Ratio t-statistic 
     
t-5 0.73 -1.71 1.46 1.44 
t-4 1.24 0.96 1.21 0.88 
t-3 0.97 -0.22 1.42 1.20 
t-2 4.59 1.02 1.39 1.31 
t-1 1.80 2.61 2.82 3.11 
t 1.31 0.60 2.20 2.52 
t+1 2.11 1.05 3.29 1.34 
t+2 1.39 0.91 1.47 1.35 
t+3 1.33 0.82 1.19 0.81 
t+4 1.93 1.61 2.45 1.71 
t+5 1.83 1.18 1.04 0.20 
t+6 1.30 0.71 2.44 1.75 
t+7 1.98 1.56 1.55 1.74 
t+8 1.73 1.57 0.99 -0.06 
t+9 1.75 1.56 1.44 1.26 
t+10 1.68 1.03 1.34 1.00 
t+11 2.04 0.78 0.96 -0.25 
t+12 1.34 1.21 1.19 1.10 
t+13 1.52 1.33 1.22 0.49 
t+14 1.04 0.27 1.25 0.77 
t+15 2.70 1.13 1.19 0.94 
Average volumes over event date and date ranges 
t-60 to t-6 1.15  1.27  
t-5 to t-1 1.87  1.66  
t 1.31  2.20  
t+1 to t+15 1.71  1.53  
T+16 to t+180 1.49  1.44  
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Table 11: Earnings Per Share for Additions One Year Pre- and Post-Event Split By 
Currency 
 Firms with Earnings in 
 GBP EUR SK DK NK SF 
N 149 129 25 12 10 9 
Mean EPS Pre-Event 12.82 1.39 6.38 5.19 5.47 9.53 
Mean EPS Post-Event 15.88 1.71 7.45 7.53 4.56 7.84 
% Change in EPS 24% 23% 17% 45% -17% -18% 
t-statistic for equality of means 0.93 1.26 0.54 0.91 0.50 0.45 
p-value for t-statistic 0.35 0.21 0.59 0.37 0.62 0.66 
 
 
Table 12: Earnings Per Share for Deletions One Year Pre- and Post-Event Split By 
Currency 
 Firms with Earnings in 
 GBP EUR SK 
N 53 41 8 
Mean EPS Pre-Event 8.75 1.17 13.58 
Mean EPS Post-Event 10.21 1.18 16.38 
% Change in EPS 17% 1% 21% 
t-statistic for equality of means 0.67 0.02 0.45 
p-value for t-statistic 0.50 0.98 0.66 
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Figure 1: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (%) from Day t-5 to day t+15 for 
Additions Sample with Outliers Removed 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Graph of Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (%) from Day t-5 to day t+15 
for Deletions Sample with Outliers Removed 
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Figure 3: Volumes and Abnormal Returns for Additions Relative to EPRA Benchmark, 
Outliers Removed 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Volumes and Abnormal Returns for Deletions Relative to EPRA Benchmark, 
Outliers Removed 
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Figure 5: Volume Ratios on days t-5 to t+15 for Additions and Deletions 
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Endnotes: 
                                                 
1
 The size of the index effect, and consequently the amount of money to be made from its existence, 
may also depend upon the value of funds tracking a particular benchmark. 
2
REITs are tax transparent entities. Whilst the detailed regulatory structure varies across markets, in the 
majority of cases REITs have to comply with a number of restrictions in order for their dividend 
payments to be exempt from corporate tax. In most countries these restrictions revolve around a 
minimum dividend payout ratio and the imposition of constraints concerning the proportion of the 
firm’s assets and income derived from real estate activity. Some countries also impose limitations in 
areas such as gearing, development activity and international operations.  
3
 More specifically, these are known as the FTSE-EPRA NAREIT indices. 
4
 However, even these indices may experience an imbalance between the number of additions and deletions due to 
the fact that most index re-compositions are driven by the event of deletions that are either acquired or bankrupt 
and hence they are not considered as “pure” deletions and need to be excluded from the sample. 
 
5
The non-parametric binomial Z-test is also performed in some studies to test the significance of the 
percentage of firms that have a positive abnormal return on the event days. However, we do not 
implement it here due to its low power. 
6
This analysis uses the average relative (stock-to-index) volume ratio over the estimation period instead 
of the average stock’s trading volume divided by the average benchmark index trading volume over the 
same period. This amendment was proposed by Goodacre& Lawrence (1994) as a volume ratio with 
improved characteristics. 
7
A post-inclusion estimation period is not needed in the case of trading activity. The price performance 
might have improved before the event, due to the potentially better performance of the firm but there is 
no evidence of increased liquidity for the stock. Therefore, the bias mentioned in the previous section 
does not apply to the volume figures, according to the literature. 
8
We only employ two size-sorted portfolios for the deletions sample since it is too small to split into 
three parts and still expect to obtain reliable results. 
9
If we employ abnormal returns constructed using the single index model to measure the returns as 
opposed to the raw returns in order to remove any effect of changing volatility in the market as a whole 
over the sample period, we obtain almost identical results, with variance ratios of 1.04 and 1.15 for 
additions and deletions respectively (as opposed to 1.01 and 1.14 for the raw returns). 
10
The figures are also uncharacteristically high on days t+11 and t+15, but we attribute these to events 
unrelated to index changes and therefore do not discuss them further; however, reassuringly, neither are 
as high as the figure of 4.6 on day t-2. 
11
It would be of interest to try to identify whether those trading before the event were mainly 
arbitrageurs and those trading on and immediately after were index funds; however, this would require 
information on the identification of specific counterparties which we do not have access to. 
12
Only a small number of papers have considered the impact of volume on the dynamics of the listed 
real estate market, and these have all focused on the US market (Cotter & Stevenson, 2008; Hung & 
Glascock, 2010; Akimov et al.,2012). 
